Poetry, Mercy, and the Phenomenology of Justice by Berger, Benjamin L.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2014
Poetry, Mercy, and the Phenomenology of Justice
Benjamin L. Berger
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bberger@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Berger, Benjamin L., "Poetry, Mercy, and the Phenomenology of Justice" (2014). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 32.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/32
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL 
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
 
Research Paper No. 34 
Vol. 10/ Issue. 09/ (2014) 
 
Poetry, Mercy, and the Phenomenology of Justice 
In Ehud Ben Zvi, Claudia V. Camp, David M. Gunn and Aaron W. Hughes, eds., 
Poets, Prophets, and Texts in Play: Studies in Biblical Poetry and Prophecy in 
Honour of Francis Landy (London: T & T Clark, forthcoming 2014). 
 






Editor-in-Chief: Carys J. Craig (Associate Dean of Research & Institutional Relations and 
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 












This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448430 
 
Further Information and a collection of publications about Osgoode Hall Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series can be found at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=722488 
 
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 34 
Vol. 10/ Issue. 09/ (2014) 
Poetry, Mercy, and the Phenomenology of Justice 
In Ehud Ben Zvi, Claudia V. Camp, David M. Gunn and Aaron W. Hughes, eds., Poets, 
Prophets, and Texts in Play: Studies in Biblical Poetry and Prophecy in Honour of Francis Landy 
(London: T & T Clark, forthcoming 2014). 
 
Benjamin L. Berger 
 
Abstract:  
What would a phenomenology of justice look like and what role would mercy play in that 
account? The unruly experiences and lives of the individuals and communities wrapped up in 
the dramas of justice are paradoxically distant from legal and philosophical reasoning, 
laundered by rules of evidence for the instrumental exigencies of the former, and frequently 
effaced by the disciplinary conventions of the latter. One casualty of these habits of 
reflection is our understanding of the role of mercy in the experience of justice. Wanting to 
recapture space to imagine the role of mercy in justice, this paper makes an exploratory turn 
to a world consumed with representing the messy experience of justice and still thick with 
the language of mercy – to the poetic and narrative world created in the Book of Jonah. 
Drawing inspiration from a close reading of this mythic tale, I argue that mercy is an 
essential feature of the phenomenological architecture of justice, requiring us, as it does, to 
connect abstract judgment with the complexities and exigencies of our concrete conditions. 
Though distant from contemporary legal and political theory, I argue that mercy in fact 
remains an uncanny aspect of our experience of justice and so demands a political and legal 
scholarship that spends as much time reflecting on the sources and nature of mercy as a 




Phenomenology; Justice; Mercy; Law; Book of Jonah; Literary Interpretation 
 
Author(s): 
Benjamin L. Berger 
Associate Professor 
Osgoode Hall Law School 




POETRY,	  MERCY,	  AND	  THE	  PHENOMENOLOGY	  OF	  JUSTICE	  	  Benjamin	  L.	  Berger*	  	  	  	   What	  would	  a	  phenomenology	  of	  justice	  look	  like?	  	  Legal	  and	  political	  philosophy	  are	  thick	  with	  theories	  of	  justice.	  	  In	  the	  articulation	  and	  defence	  of	  those	  theories,	  thought	  conventionally	  proceeds	  from	  ideal	  principle	  or	  a	  
priori	  commitment	   to	  a	  claim	  about	  what	   justice	  ought	   to	   look	   like	  or	  what	  principles	  should	  guide	  us	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  just.	  The	  experience	  of	  justice—of	  wrong	   and	   pain,	   of	   judgment	   and	   forgiveness,	   of	   punishment	   and	  redemption—is	  notably	  absent	  from	  scholarly	  reflection	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  is,	  in	  some	  measure,	  an	  artefact	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  disciplines	  and	  their	  sources.	  	  Neither	  case	  law,	  statute,	  nor	  treatise	  gives	  priority	  to	  the	  messiness	  of	  everyday	  life.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  suppression	  of	  experience	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  law	  and	  much	  political	  philosophy,	  both	  of	  which	  thrive	  on	  the	  muting	  of	  certain	   voices	   in	   favor	   of	   authoritative	   others	   and	   on	   the	   sorting	   and	  rendering	  of	  “the	  facts”	   to	  serve	  analytic	  ends.	   	  The	  unruly	  experiences	  and	  lives	  of	  the	  individuals	  and	  communities	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  dramas	  of	  justice	  are	  paradoxically	  distant	   from	   legal	  and	  philosophical	   reasoning,	   laundered	  by	   rules	   of	   evidence	   (and	   the	   tyranny	   of	   relevance)	   for	   the	   instrumental	  exigencies	   of	   the	   former,	   and	   frequently	   effaced	   by	   the	   disciplinary	  conventions	   of	   the	   latter.	   	   There	   is	  much	   truth	   in	  Bruno	   Latour’s	   felicitous	  image	  of	  attempting	  to	  access	  knowledge	  of	  life	  through	  the	  language	  of	  law:	  that	  doing	  so	  is	  “like	  trying	  to	  fax	  a	  pizza”.1	  	  	  	   Might	  it	  be	  that	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  experience	  of	   justice	  drop	  out	  of	  view	  with	  this	  troubling	  inaccessibility	  of	  life	  itself?	  	  Of	  particular	  interest	  in	   this	  chapter	   is	   the	  contemporary	  place	  of	  mercy	   in	  our	  understanding	  of	  justice.	   	  To	   say	   that	  we	  do	  not	   live	   in	  merciful	   times	  could	  be	   to	  make	   two	  quite	  different	  observations,	   though	  they	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  related.	   	  One	  would	  be	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  experiencing	  a	  time	  of	  increased	  harshness	  in	  the	  law,	  a	  period	  characterized	  by	  an	  excess	  of	  punitiveness	  and	  a	  scarcity	  of	  compassion.	   	  Such	  a	  claim	  is	  no	  doubt	  defensible	  in	  some	  political	  and	  legal	  contexts,	   though	   it	   tends	   to	   wither	   in	   historical	   perspective.	   	   The	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  Thank you to Hannah Askew, 
John Borrows, Lisa Kerr, and James Stribopoulos for their generous engagement with earlier 
drafts of this piece.  Many thanks also to Geneviève Murray (JD, Osgoode/NYU) for her excellent 
research assistance in the preparation of this chapter.  The author gratefully acknowledges the 
financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 
1 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2010), 268. 
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reliable	  claim	  is	  that	  we	  live	  in	  times	  in	  which	  talk	  of	  mercy	  does	  not	  circulate	  freely	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  reflection,	  times	  in	  which	  mercy	  does	  not	  present	  itself	   prominently	   as	   a	   political	   or	   legal	   virtue.	   	   That	   observation	   seems	  harder	  to	  contest.	  	  Indeed,	  language	  of	  mercy	  –	  once	  more	  central	  to	  political	  rhetoric	   about	   the	   interaction	   of	   law	   and	   justice,	   but	   more	   on	   this	   later	   –	  would	  seem	  oddly	  out	  of	  place	   in	  contemporary	   institutions	  of	  governance.	  	  Language	  of	  mercy	  is	  not	  absent	  from	  the	  social	  world,	  but	  its	  appearance	  in	  political	   or	   legal	   registers	   seems	   like	   a	   category	   error,	   somehow	  anachronistic,	  perhaps	  even	  a	  little	  embarrassing.	  	  Speaking	  of	  mercy	  seems	  incongruous	   with	   the	   rhetorical	   and	   analytical	   conventions	   of	   the	   modern	  secular	   rule	  of	   law.	   	  But	   the	   force	  of	   these	   conventions	  nevertheless	   leaves	  the	   organizing	   question	   in	   this	   chapter	   untouched:	   what	   role,	   if	   any,	   does	  mercy	  play	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  justice	  and	  what	  might	  this	  suggest	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  justice	  itself?	  	  	   This	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  phenomenological	  question,	  one	  that	  seeks	  to	  ground	   reflection	   in	   the	   experience	   of	   lived	   encounter.	   	   The	   great	  hermeneutic	  phenomenologist	  Wilhelm	  Dilthey	  claimed	  that	  “life	  is	  the	  basic	  element	  or	  fact	  which	  must	  form	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  philosophy”;	  that	  life	  is	   that	   “behind	   which	   we	   cannot	   go.”2 	  	   As	   a	   legal	   theorist,	   given	   the	  constraints	  of	  traditional	  sources	  and	  texts,	  where	  can	  one	  turn	  for	  access	  to	  “life”?	  	  Some	  might	  turn	  to	  the	  empirical,	  some	  to	  ethnography,	  others	  still	  to	  history.	   	  Yet	   this	   is	  also	  when	  narrative,	  story,	  and	  poetry	  offer	   themselves.	  	  In	   these	   creative	   forms	   we	   find	   a	   capacity	   to	   unsettle	   ideas,	   to	   aggravate	  convention,	   and	   trouble	   settled	   wisdom.	   	   And	   so,	   despite	   my	   years	   in	   the	  wilderness	   of	   legal	   scholarship,	   this	   exploratory	   return	   to	   poetry	   and	  prophecy	  is	  very	  much	  influenced	  by	  the	  guiding	  ethos	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Francis	  Landy:	  that	  life	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  poetry	  and	  stories	  that	  communities	  hold	  precious	  over	  time;	  that	  there	  is	  an	  existential	  wisdom	  to	  be	  found	  in	  poetry	  and	  through	  attention	  to	  the	  fruits	  of	  imagination.	  	  	  	   Wanting	   to	  recapture	  space	   to	   imagine	  the	  role	  of	  mercy	   in	   justice,	   I	  turn	  to	  a	  world	  consumed	  with	  representing	  the	  messy	  experience	  of	  justice	  and	  still	   thick	  with	  the	   language	  of	  mercy,	   the	  world	  created	   in	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah.	  	  After	  listening	  carefully	  to	  the	  narrative	  and	  metaphor	  of	  the	  story	  of	  Jonah,	  I	  will	  turn	  back	  to	  consider	  what	  lessons	  it	  might	  offer	  about	  the	  place	  of	   mercy	   in	   the	   architecture	   of	   justice	   and	   what	   this	   might	   suggest	   for	  contemporary	  legal	  and	  political	  thought.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Wilhelm Dilthey, Gessammelte Schriften (vol. VII; Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1959), 359.  
Translated and cited in Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in 




Justice,	  Mercy,	  and	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  
	  	   The	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  offers	  itself	  as	  a	  parable.3	  	  It	  begins	  in	  the	  familiar	  idiom	  of	  the	  prophetic	  writings	  –	  “the	  word	  of	  the	  Lord	  came	  to	  Jonah	  son	  of	  Amittai”4	  –	   but	   this	   form	   is	   conjured	   only	   to	   be	   immediately	   disrupted.	  	  Having	   heard	   God’s	   judgment	   against	   the	   city	   of	   Nineveh	   and	   received	   his	  instruction	  to	  “Go	  at	  once	  to	  Nineveh”	  to	  communicate	  that	  judgment,	  Jonah	  flees,	   seeking	   to	   escape	   his	   task.	   	   The	   trope	   of	   the	   reluctant	   prophet	   is	  common	  enough	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible,	  but,	  as	  with	  much	  in	  this	  strange	  story,	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  plays	  with	  and	  magnifies	  the	  form,	  alerting	  the	  reader	  that	  she	  is	  in	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  narrative	  space,	  a	  kind	  of	  parody	  of	  prophecy	  that	  is	   stamped	   with	   didactic	   intentionality.5	  	   Jonah	   is	   also	   a	   strangely	   private	  prophet,	  with	  narrative	  taking	  precedence	  over	  prophecy	  in	  the	  Book.	  	  Apart	  from	  his	  brief	  exchange	  with	   the	  sailors	  on	   the	  ship	   to	  which	  he	   flees	   from	  God,	   an	   exchange	   that	   culminates	   with	   him	   declaring	   his	   own	   guilt	   and	  sentence	   (to	   be	   heaved	   overboard	   in	   order	   to	   calm	   the	   sea),	   Jonah	  pronounces	  only	  one	  short	  phrase	  capable	  of	  being	  heard	  by	  an	  audience	  in	  his	   narrative	   world:	   his	   perfunctory	   statement,	   just	   1/3	   of	   the	   way	   into	  Nineveh,	   that	   “Forty	   days	  more,	   and	  Nineveh	   shall	   be	   overthrown!”	   (Jonah	  3:4)	  The	  imagined	  audience	  of	  the	  story	  is	  the	  reader,	  who	  travels	  alongside	  an	  omniscient	  narrator,	  zooming	  from	  sea	  to	  city,	  into	  the	  belly	  of	  a	  fish	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I am mindful that the question of the technical genre to which the Book of Jonah belongs – be it 
satire, allegory, folktale, midrash, parody, etc. – is a contentious one in the literature.  See, for 
example, Thomas M. Bolin, Freedom Beyond Forgiveness: The Book of Jonah Re-Examined 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Acadmic Press, 1997), 46ff.  Not interested (or equipped) to enter into this 
debate, I am describing the story as “parable” in a more casual sense, emphasizing my reading of 
the Book as a short story intended to communicate a lesson.    
4 All quotations from the Book of Jonah are based on the Jewish Publication Society translation of 
the Tanakh (1985), checked against the author’s reading of the Hebrew text and except where 
otherwise indicated. 
5 On the basis of the atypical features of the book, Ben Zvi characterizes the Book of Jonah as a 
“meta-prophetic” book, in which “the literary genre and the image of past prophets are 
manipulated… for rhetorical purposes.” See Ehud Ben Zvi, Signs of Jonah: Reading and 
Rereading in Ancient Yehud (London and New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 82.  On 
the Book of Jonah as parody, see William W. Hallo, "Jonah and the Uses of Parody," in Thus Says 
the Lard: Essays on the Former and Latter Prophets in Honor of Robert R. Wilson (eds. Ahn and 
Cook; New York and London: T & T Clark, 2009), 285-291.  Hallo explains that the book “mocks 
the conventions of classical prophecy, from the divine call at the outset, through the personal 
involvement, and even misadventures, of the prophet, to the abrupt and surprising ending" (290).  
For an account of the various intertextual allusions and references in the Book of Jonah, see Hyun 
Chul Paul Kim, "Jonah Read Intertextually," Journal of Biblical Literature 126.3 (2007): 497-528.   
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the	   interior	   life	   of	   Jonah.6	  	   The	   reader	   is	   the	   narrator’s	   audience,	   not	   the	  prophet’s.	  All	   of	   this	   contributes	   to	   the	   strong	   narrative	   hand	   characteristic	   of	  parable	   and	   folk	   tale,	   a	   parabolic	   sense	   that	   is	   deepened	   by	   the	   notable	  brevity	  of	   the	   story	   and,	   of	   course,	   the	   appearance	   in	   the	   story	  of	   fantastic	  elements—a	  giant	  fish	  that	  rescues	  Jonah	  from	  the	  sea,	  and	  a	  magical	  plant,	  whose	  creation	  and	  destruction	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  didactic	  climax	  of	  the	  story.	  	  The	  central	  dramatic	  tension	  is	  introduced	  in	  the	  story	  swiftly	  and	  clearly,	   avoiding	   any	   kind	   of	   distraction	   and	   dispensing	   with	   narrative	  foreplay.	   	  The	  word	  of	  God	  comes	  to	  Jonah,	  instructs	  him,	  but	  he	  chooses	  to	  flee.	   	   The	   reader	   is,	   thus,	   immediately	   confronted	   with	   the	   problem	   that	  frames	  the	  story	  and	  anchors	  the	  message	  of	  the	  book:	  why	  did	  Jonah	  flee?	  	  	  If	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  encounter	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  as	  a	  parable,	  what	  is	  it	  a	  parable	  about?	  The	  reading	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  in	  this	  piece	  is	  that	  the	  Book	   of	   Jonah	   is,	   at	   its	   heart,	   a	   parable	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   justice.7	  	  More	  particularly,	   the	   narrator	   of	   the	   Book	   is	   interested	   in	   communicating	   a	  message	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   judgment	   and	   mercy,	   the	   human	  temptations	  of	   the	   former	  and	  the	  need	  and	  virtue	  of	   the	   latter.	   	  This	  short	  story	   is	   thick	   with	  moments	   of	   judgment,	   of	   punishment	   and	   forbearance,	  and	   invocation	   of	   that	   complicated	   word	   ḥesed	   –“compassion”	   or	   “mercy”.	  	  Read	  in	  one	  way,	  the	  cumulative	  message	  of	  these	  episodes	  of	  judgment	  and	  justice	   is	   to	   underscore	   and	   valorize	   God’s	   mercy	   and	   compassion	   in	  response	   to	   remorse.	   	   God	   saves	   Jonah	   from	   the	   sea	   when	   he	   calls	   out	   in	  prayer,	   he	   saves	   the	   people	   of	   Nineveh	  when	   their	   King	   leads	   them	   in	   the	  collective	  expression	  of	  repentance.	  	  My	  reading	  is	  somewhat	  different.	  	  Close	  attention	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  culminating	  metaphor	  of	  the	  story	  points	  not	  to	   a	   message	   about	   God’s	   mercy,	   but	   about	   the	   human	   perils	   of	   finding	  comfort	  in	  the	  life-­‐flattening	  simplicity	  of	  judgment.	  Before	   focussing	   in	  on	  this	  pivotal	  metaphor	  with	  which	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	   concludes,	   it	   is	   worth	   mapping	   the	   narrative	   shape	   of	   the	   story	   of	  Jonah	  with	   this	   focus	  on	   judgment	  and	  mercy	   in	  mind,	  drawing	  out	   certain	  key	  features	  of	  the	  tale.	  	  The	  story	  begins,	  of	  course,	  with	  God	  announcing	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On the narrative and rhetorical structure of the Book of Jonah, see Benjamin L. Berger, 
"Picturing the Prophet: Focalization in the Book of Jonah," Studies in Religion 29. 1 (2000): 55-
68; Kenneth M. Craig, Jr., A Poetics of Jonah: Art in the Service of Ideology (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1993). 
7 For a helpful survey of various historical and modern interpretations of, and interpretive debates 
about, the Book of Jonah, see Bolin, Freedom Beyond Forgiveness.  See also T. Anthony Perry, 
The Honeymoon is Over: Jonah's Argument with God (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 
2006).  For an insightful analysis of the readings available to the ancient readers of the Book of 
Jonah, see Ben Zvi, Signs of Jonah. 
	  5	  
judgment	   of	   Nineveh	   to	   Jonah,	   a	   judgment	   that	   arises	   because	   “their	  wickedness	  has	  come	  before	  Me”	  (Jonah	  1:1).	  The	  Book’s	  call	  and	  response	  rhythm	  of	   judgment	   and	   reaction,	  mercy	   and	   reaction,	   begins	   immediately,	  with	  Jonah’s	  flight	  to	  Tarshish.	  	  Why	  does	  he	  flee?	  	  Does	  he	  disagree	  with	  the	  judgment?	  	  Does	  he	  think	  it	  unfair?	  	  Does	  he	  recoil	  at	  the	  looming	  loss	  of	  life?	  	  The	   reader	   simply	   doesn’t	   know	   at	   this	   point.	   	   And	   with	   this,	   the	   initial	  narrative	   line	   concerned	   with	   the	   judgment	   and	   treatment	   of	   Nineveh	   is	  suspended,	  and	  focus	  turns	  to	  Jonah’s	  voyage	  to	  Tarshish	  by	  sea.	  	  	  A	  storm	  hits	  the	  ship,	  endangering	  the	  non-­‐Hebrew	  crew	  who	  call	  out	  in	  fear	  to	  their	  various	  gods.	  	  Flinging	  cargo	  into	  the	  sea	  to	  lighten	  the	  ship	  in	  the	   hopes	   of	   saving	   themselves,	   they	   discover	   Jonah	   sleeping	   in	   the	   hold.	  	  Roused	   by	   the	   sailors	   and	   called	   upon	   to	   assist,	   Jonah	   remains	   silent.	   	   The	  sailors	  decide	  to	  take	  action	  and	  cast	  lots	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  storm.	  	  The	  lot	  falls	  on	  Jonah.	  	  This	  is	  the	  second	  moment	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  Book.	  	  Jonah	  tells	  them	  who	  he	  is	  and	  that	  he	  worships	  “the	  Lord,	  the	  God	  of	  Heaven,	  who	  made	  both	  sea	  and	  land”	  (Jonah	  1:9).	  The	  men	  are	  terrified	  to	  learn	  that	  his	  guilt	  arises	  from	  fleeing	  the	  service	  of	  his	  God,	  asking	  what	  they	  can	  do	  to	  save	  themselves.	   	   Jonah	  admits	  his	  responsibility	  and	  pronounces	  his	  own	  sentence:	  they	  should	  throw	  him	  overboard.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  reader	  finds	  the	  first	  expression	  of	  mercy,	  not	  from	  God	   but	   from	   these	   foreign	   sailors	   who	   worship	   other	   gods.	   	   A	   sound	  judgment	   firmly	   in	   hand	   and	   a	   sensible	   punishment	   pronounced,	   they	  nevertheless	   initially	   decline	   to	   throw	   Jonah	   overboard,	   futilely	   rowing	  instead	  for	  the	  shore.	  	  When	  this	  fails	  they	  resign	  themselves	  to	  the	  judgment	  and	  punishment,	  expressing	  concern,	  however,	  that	  the	  judgment	  is	  accurate.	  	  “Do	   not	   hold	   us	   guilty	   of	   killing	   an	   innocent	   person,”	   they	   cry	   out,	   before	  heaving	  Jonah	  overboard.	  	  When	  the	  sea	  calms,	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  lots	  is,	  in	  a	   sense,	   confirmed	   on	   appeal:	   Jonah	   was	   guilty	   and	   this	   punishment	   is	  correct.	  	  	  In	   a	   remarkable	   scene	   change,	   the	   narrative	   focus	   moves	   to	   Jonah	  praying	  to	  God,	  cradled	  inside	  the	  belly	  of	  a	  huge	  fish	  that	  God	  sent	  to	  save	  Jonah.	   	   For	   three	   days	   and	   nights	   he	   lives	   in	   the	   belly	   and,	   in	   our	   most	  sustained	  exposure	  to	  Jonah’s	  internal	  life,	  the	  reader	  is	  told	  what	  Jonah	  says	  when	   he	   prays	   to	   God.	   	   In	   his	   song,	   Jonah	   describes	   in	   poetic	   detail	   the	  experience	  of	  his	  punishment,	  of	  God	  (note,	  not	  the	  sailors)	  casting	  him	  into	  the	  sea,	  the	  darkness	  and	  estrangement	  from	  God	  that	  Jonah	  experienced	  as	  the	  waters	  flooded	  over	  him,	  and	  his	  moment	  of	  realization	  that	  he	  will	  not	  see	  the	  Temple	  again.	  	  Jonah	  sings	  that	  he	  prayed	  to	  God	  and	  God	  responded,	  saving	  his	  life.	  	  And	  his	  conclusion?	  	  Jonah	  affirms	  that	  he	  will	  obey	  God,	  will	  sacrifice	  to	  Him,	  and	  proclaims	  that	  “Deliverance	  is	  the	  Lord’s!”	  (Jonah	  2:10)	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But	  he	  also	   states	  a	   lesson	   from	  his	   experience,	   a	   lesson	  whose	  meaning	   is	  elusive	  and	  variously	   interpreted:	   “They	  who	  cling	   to	  empty	   folly	  /	   forsake	  their	  own	  welfare”	  (Jonah	  2:9).	  Sasson,	  who	  notes	  that	  this	  “strophe”	  stands	  out	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  prayer,	  translates	  Jonah’s	  aphorism	  differently:	  “They	  who	  hold	  to	  empty	  faiths,	  /	  give	  up	  their	  hope	  for	  mercy”.8	  	  The	  pivotal	  words	  are	  havlei-­‐sav	   and	  ḥasdam,	   a	   form	  of	   the	  word	  ḥesed.	   	   The	   first	   carries	   the	  sense	  of	  vanity	  or	  illusion,	  of	  extreme	  folly.	  	  The	  second	  –	  holding	  the	  senses	  of	  mercy	  and	  compassion	  –	  will	  reappear	  as	  the	  story	  unfolds;	  here	  it	  carries	  the	  third	  person	  personal	  suffix,	  suggesting	  that	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  loss	  of	  
their	  mercy.	  	  This	  is	  a	  curious	  lesson	  whose	  meaning	  is	  unclear	  at	  this	  stage	  in	  the	  story,	  but	  its	  emphasis	  is,	  on	  my	  reading,	  significant.	  After	   the	   fish	   vomits	   Jonah	   onto	   the	   beach,	   the	   larger	   narrative	   arc	  resumes,	  or	  more	  accurately	  restarts,	  with	  Jonah’s	  mission	  to	  Nineveh	  redux.	  	  God	   refreshes	   his	   instruction	   to	   go	   to	  Nineveh	   and	  proclaim	  His	   judgment.	  	  This	   time	   Jonah	   complies	   and	  when	   he	   is	   1/3	   of	   the	  way	   into	   the	   city,	   he	  laconically	   (are	   we	   invited	   to	   think	   he	   does	   so	   reluctantly?)	   prophesies	  Nineveh’s	  demise.	   	  The	  people	  of	  Nineveh	  respond	  admirably.	   	  They	  believe	  God.	   	  They	   immediately	  begin	   to	  atone,	  with	   the	  King	  declaring	  a	  period	  of	  repentance,	   admitting	   the	   existence	   of	   evil	   ways	   and	   injustices	   in	   Nineveh	  and	  calling	  on	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  city	  to	  “turn	  back”	  from	  that	  wickedness	  in	  the	   hope	   that	   God	  may,	   Himself	   “turn”	   –	   “turn	   and	   relent”	   and	   “turn	   back	  from	  His	  wrath”	  (Jonah	  3:9).	  And	  God	  does.	  	  The	  reader	  is	  told	  that	  “God	  saw	  what	  they	  did,	  how	  they	  were	  turning	  back	  from	  their	  evil	  ways”	  and	  that	  he	  therefore	   “renounced	   the	  punishment	  He	  had	  planned	   to	  bring	  upon	   them”	  (Jonah	  3:10).	  It	   is	   at	   this	   point	   that	   the	   dramatic	   tension	   generated	   in	   the	   first	  verses	   of	   the	   book	   shows	   itself	   again,	   calling	   now	   for	   resolution.	   	   Though	  confirmed	  in	  his	  judgment	  of	  the	  city	  by	  the	  King’s	  own	  admissions,	  God	  has	  relented	   from	   the	   punishment	   that	   He	   had	   in	   store	   for	   Nineveh	   (the	  wholesale	  destruction	  of	  the	  city,	  we	  are	  left	  to	  presume,	  given	  God’s	  pattern	  of	  prior	  bad	  acts).9	  	  This	  is	  our	  third	  act	  of	  mercy	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  –	  the	  sailors’	  mercy	   extended	   to	   Jonah,	  God’s	  mercy	   extended	   to	   Jonah,	   and	  now	  this.	   	  Yet	   the	  reader	   learns	  that	   Jonah	   is	  upset	  by	  this	   turn	  of	  events.	   	  He	   is	  “grieved”	  by	  God’s	  failure	  to	  punish	  and	  prays	  to	  God,	  providing	  the	  answer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jack M. Sasson, Jonah: A New Translation with Introduction, Commentary, and Interpretation 
(New York and London: Doubleday, 1990), 160. 
9 Indeed, historical Nineveh was destroyed, a fact that haunts the interpretation of the story.  In 
particular, Ben Zvi’s volume on the Book of Jonah explores the way in which this historical fact 
might have inflected an ancient reader’s interpretation of the Book (Ben Zvi, Signs of Jonah).  In 
this readerly world, did the common knowledge that God would eventually destroy Nineveh give a 
darkly ironic coloring to God’s apparently rhetorical question with which the book ends?  
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to	   the	  reader’s	  earlier	  question:	  why	  did	  he	   flee?	   “That	   is	  why	   I	   fled	  before	  hand	  to	  Tarshish,”	  he	  explains,	  “For	  I	  know	  that	  You	  are	  a	  compassionate	  and	  gracious	   God,	   slow	   to	   anger,	   abounding	   in	   kindness	   (ḥesed),	   renouncing	  punishment”	   (Jonah	   4:2).10	  	   This	   is	   the	   key	   dramatic	   turn	   in	   the	   narrative.	  	  Jonah	   did	   not	   flee	   because	   he	   recoiled	   from	   the	   death	   of	   hundreds	   of	  thousands	   in	  Nineveh	  or	  because	  he	  thought	   it	  unfair.	   	   Instead,	  compassion	  and	  mercy	   (ḥesed)	   are	   the	   complaint;	   Jonah	   fled	   because	   he	   feared	   that	   he	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  God	  to	  carry	  out	  His	  judgment.	  	  Introducing	  the	  first	  half	  of	  a	  parallelism	  that	  structures	  the	  defining	  metaphor	  of	  the	  story,	  Jonah	  prays	  to	   God	   to	   kill	   him,	   “for	   I	   would	   rather	   die	   than	   live”	   (Jonah	   4:3),	   and	   God	  responds	  by	  asking	  “are	  you	  that	  deeply	  grieved?”	  (Jonah	  4:4)	  	  In	  his	  dismay,	   Jonah	  leaves	  the	  city	  and,	  building	  a	  shelter	  for	  shade,	  watches	  the	  city.	   	  (What	   is	  he	  watching	  for?)	   	  God	  now	  takes	  steps	  to	  teach	  Jonah	  a	   lesson.	   	  He	   causes	   a	  plant	   (qiqayon,	   often	   translated	  as	   “gourd”)	   to	  grow,	   providing	   shade	   and	   comfort	   to	   Jonah,	   who	   is	   very	   pleased	   by	   the	  gourd,	  despite	  apparently	  already	  having	  shade	  from	  the	  booth	  that	  he	  built.	  	  But	  just	  as	  Jonah	  becomes	  attached	  to	  this	  plant,	  God	  sends	  a	  worm	  to	  attack	  the	  plant,	  killing	  it	  as	  the	  sun	  rises.	   	  The	  east	  wind	  blows	  and	  the	  sun	  beats	  down	  on	  Jonah’s	  head,	  making	  him	  faint	  and	  adding	  to	  his	  despair.	  	  In	  a	  tight	  parallelism	  with	   his	   reaction	   to	   God	   sparing	   Nineveh,	   the	   narrator	   reports	  that	   Jonah	   calls	   out	   for	   death,	   saying	   “I	  would	   rather	   die	   than	   live”	   (Jonah	  4:8),	   and	   God	   asking	   “are	   you	   so	   deeply	   grieved	   about	   the	   gourd?”	   	  When	  Jonah	   confirms,	   in	   his	   final	   words	   in	   the	   book,	   that	   yes,	   he	   is	   so	   deeply	  grieved	  that	  he	  wishes	  to	  die,	  God	  chastises	  him	  for	  caring	  so	  much	  about	  the	  gourd,	  which	  he	  had	  no	   role	   in	   creating,	   and	  which	   sped	   through	  existence	  and	  demise,	  and	  yet	  being	  insensitive	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Ninevites.	   	  “[S]hould	  not	  I	  care	  about	  Nineveh,”	  God	  asks	  Jonah,	  “that	  great	  city,	  in	  which	  there	  are	  more	   than	   a	   hundred	   and	   twenty	   thousand	   persons	  who	   do	   not	   yet	   know	  their	  right	  hand	  from	  their	  left,	  and	  many	  beasts	  as	  well!”	  (Jonah	  4:11)	  It	  is	  this	  experience	  of	  the	  plant	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  teach	  Jonah	  a	  lesson	  and	  to	  afford	  the	  moral	  of	  this	  parable.	  	  The	  analogy	  that	  God	  draws	  between	  the	  plant	  and	   the	   lives	  of	   the	  people	   in	  Nineveh	  –	   specifically,	   those	  within	  the	   city	   who	   would	   be	   morally	   innocent	   –	   invites	   a	   certain	   conventional	  interpretation.	   	  That	   reading	  of	   the	   story	   takes	   the	  message	  as	  being	  God’s	  justice	   as	   expressed	   in	  his	   regard	   for	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   innocent,	   and	   Jonah’s	  failure	  as	   inhering	   in	  a	  kind	  of	  narrowness	  and	  selfishness,	  one	   that	   comes	  out	  in	  his	  delight	  at	  his	  own	  comfort	  but	  occludes	  his	  regard	  for	  justice.	  	  That	  interpretation,	   which	   turns	   on	   the	   parallel	   between	   the	   plant	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is, of course, a radically incomplete description of the character of the God of the Hebrew 
Bible.   
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innocent	  in	  Nineveh,	  is	  natural	  enough;	  after	  all,	  God	  invites	  it	  with	  his	  own	  words.	  	  Yet	   there	   are	   problems	  with	   this	   reading.	   	   First,	   it	  makes	  God	   seem	  foolish.	  	  He	  was	  presumably	  always	  aware	  that	  there	  were	  large	  numbers	  of	  innocents	  in	  Nineveh	  and	  yet	  was,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  story,	  willing	  to	  destroy	  the	  city	  in	  light	  of	  the	  wickedness	  of	  some.	  	  Second,	  and	  related,	  it	  reads	  the	  repentance	  of	  the	  Ninevites	  out	  of	  the	  narrative;	  though	  the	  story	  suggests	  in	  3:10	   that	   God	   stayed	   his	   executing	   hand	   because	   the	   people	   of	   Nineveh	  “turn[ed]	  back	  from	  their	  evil	  ways”,	  taking	  God’s	  analogy	  at	  face	  value	  says,	  instead,	  that	  God	  spared	  Nineveh	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  innocent,	  not	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  guilty.	  	  Third,	  this	  reading	  orphans	  the	  entire	  episode	  on	  the	  ship	  and	  in	  the	  belly	  of	  the	  fish.	  	  Why	  was	  the	  narrative	  detail	  around	  this	  experience	  necessary?	   	   If	   one	   holds	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   godly	   compassion,	   this	   episode	  recedes	   to	   mere	   narrative	   device,	   a	   way	   of	   getting	   a	   reluctant	   prophet	   to	  Nineveh.	   	   Indeed,	  and	  crucially,	  on	   this	   interpretation	   Jonah’s	   flight	  and	  his	  explanation	  that	  he,	  in	  effect,	  feared	  God’s	  mercy	  remains	  puzzling.	  	  	  But	   this	   more	   obvious	   interpretation	   leans,	   I	   suggest,	   on	   a	   flawed	  reading	  of	   the	  metaphor	  constructed	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  book.	   	  Revisiting	   the	  structure	  of	  that	  metaphor	  opens	  up	  a	  different	  message,	  one,	  I	  suggest	  that	  makes	   Jonah	   a	   much	   more	   psychologically	   subtle	   and	   interesting	   parable,	  one	  with	  deep	  contemporary	  political	  relevance.	  Structurally,	  the	  parallel	  constructed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  is	  not	   drawn	   between	   the	   innocent	   people	   in	   Nineveh	   and	   the	   plant;	   it	   is	  between	  the	  original	  judgment	  against	  Nineveh	  and	  the	  plant.	  	  As	  readers,	  we	  are	  given	  two	  virtually	   identical	  sets	  of	  reactions	  from	  Jonah	  and	  responses	  from	  God	  –	   Jonah	  expresses	  his	  dismay	  by	   saying	   that	  he	  would	   rather	  die	  than	  live,	  and	  God	  responds	  by	  asking	  if	  he	  is	  really	  that	  deeply	  grieved.	  	  Both	  are	   reactions	   to	   a	   loss	   of	   something.	   	   The	   second	   episode	   is	   clear	   enough:	  Jonah	   is	  happy	  about	   this	  magically	   appearing	  plant,	   the	  plant	  dies,	   and	  he	  bemoans	  its	  loss,	  which	  leaves	  him	  exposed	  to	  the	  “sultry	  east	  wind”	  and	  the	  sun	  beating	  down	  on	  his	  head.	   	  God	   is	  specific	   in	  his	  questions:	  “are	  you	  so	  deeply	  grieved	  about	  the	  plant?”	  	  Jonah	  confirms	  the	  object	  of	  his	  grief:	  “yes…	  so	  deeply	  that	  I	  want	  to	  die.”	  	  	  What,	  then,	  is	  the	  loss	  that	  Jonah	  mourned	  after	  Nineveh	  is	  saved?	  	  If	  one	   follows	   the	   structural	  parallel,	   the	   loss	   is	   the	   “loss”	  of	   the	  punishment.	  	  Focussing	   on	   the	   comparison	   that	   God	   draws	   between	   the	   plant	   and	   the	  innocent	  of	  Nineveh	  abandons	  the	  poetic	  structure,	  thereby	  obscuring	  a	  key	  avenue	   of	   interpretation.	   	   The	   narrative	   sets	   up	   a	   metaphor	   in	   which	   the	  judgment	   against	   Nineveh	   is	   like	   the	   plant.	   	   How	  might	   this	   be	   so?	   	  What	  message	  might	  be	  contained	  in	  this	  equivalence?	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Jonah	   found	   comfort	   in	   the	   shelter	   provided	   by	   the	   plant	   that	   God	  suddenly	  generated;	  we	  are	   told	   that	   the	  plant	  provided	  shade	   for	  his	  head	  and	  rescued	  him	  from	  discomfort.	  	  The	  source	  of	  discomfort	  here	  is	  the	  lived	  conditions	   that	   Jonah	   faces	   sitting	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   Nineveh,	   the	   harsh	  reality	  of	  the	  wind	  and	  a	  punishing	  sun.	  	  He	  swiftly	  attaches	  to	  this	  plant,	  but	  it	   turns	   out	   that	   the	   plant	   was	   temporary,	   fleeting,	   and	   vulnerable.	   	   He	  mourns	  the	  loss	  of	  this	  source	  of	  shelter,	  one	  that	  wasn’t	  of	  his	  creation,	  that	  he	  didn’t	  really	  need	  (as	  he	  had	  built	  his	  own	  structure	  to	  offer	  him	  shade),	  and	  that	  “came	  into	  being	  overnight	  and	  perished	  overnight.”	  The	   plant-­‐judgment	   metaphor	   invites	   the	   reader	   to	   view	   Jonah’s	  attachment	   to	  God’s	   judgment	   in	   similar	   terms.	   	   Jonah	   finds	   comfort	   in	   the	  certainty	  of	  judgment.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  plant	  would	  offer	  shelter	  from	  certain	  lived	  realities,	  so	  too	  did	  God’s	  judgment.	  	  It	  cast	  a	  shadow	  over	  the	  complexity	  of	  life	   in	  Nineveh,	  one	   in	  which	  wickedness	  sits	  alongside	  virtue,	  blame	  meets	  repentance,	  and	  guilt	  and	  innocence	  are	  perilously	  hard	  to	  disentangle.	  	  It	  is	  easier	   and	  more	   comfortable,	   the	  metaphor	   suggests,	   to	   sit	   in	   the	   shade	   of	  clear	  and	  certain	  judgment,	  though	  this	  would	  hide	  from	  one’s	  eyes,	  as	  it	  did	  for	   Jonah,	   the	  Ninevites’	   capacity	   for	   insight	   and	   repentance,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  injustices	   that	   would	   be	   done	   in	   the	   name	   of	   harsh	   and	   sure	   punishment.	  	  God	   spares	   Nineveh	   when	   his	   initial	   response	   to	   their	   wickedness	   is	  combined	   with	   a	   fuller	   experience	   of	   their	   humanity,	   one	   that	   reveals	   an	  internal	   life	   that	   is	  not	   adequately	   addressed	  by	   the	   categories	  of	   guilt	   and	  punishment.	   	   As	   Scholem	   explains,	   “Jonah	   takes	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   law,	  and	   from	  this	  side	  he	   is	   indeed	  right;	  God	  takes	   that	  of	   justice”.11	  	  When,	   in	  the	   final	  phrases	  of	   the	  book,	  God	  points	   to	   the	   transience	  of	   the	  plant	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  those	  –	  human	  and	  beast	  –	  that	  could	  not	  be	  held	  to	  blame,	  He	   is	   showing	   Jonah	   the	   folly	   and	   potential	   injustice	   of	   holding	   fast	   to	  abstract	  judgment	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  regard	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  life.	  On	   this	   interpretation,	   which	   arises	   from	   taking	   the	   metaphor	   of	  judgment/plant	  seriously,	  the	  earlier	  episode	  on	  the	  ship	  and	  Jonah’s	  prayer	  inside	   the	   fish	   assume	   a	   central	   place	   in	   the	   message	   of	   the	   parable	   as	   a	  whole.	   	   Having	   felt	   and	   heard	   God’s	   reproach	   for	   his	   attachment	   to	   the	  comfort	   of	   the	   categorical	   certainties	   of	   judgment,	   one	   can	   imagine	   Jonah’s	  mind	  turning	  back	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  his	  own	  judgment,	  punishment,	  and	  rescue	  at	  sea.	  	  On	  the	  ship	  to	  Tarshish,	  Jonah	  was	  rightly	  judged	  responsible	  for	  the	  storm	  that	  threatened	  the	  ship	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  sailors.	  	  Although	  Jonah	  had,	   in	   fact,	   confirmed	  his	  own	  guilt,	   even	  pronouncing	  his	   sentence,	  the	  sailors	   initially	  demurred,	   the	  first	   in	  the	  story	  to	  hesitate	   in	  the	  face	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gershom Scholem, "On Jonah and the Concept of Justice," Critical Inquiry 25.2 (1999): 353-61, 
357.  Scholem similarly reads the Book of Jonah as “a lesson about the order of the just” (354).  
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the	  dangers	  of	  judgment.	  	  In	  his	  song	  from	  the	  belly	  of	  the	  fish	  that	  God	  sent	  to	  rescue	  him,	  Jonah	  describes	  his	  experience	  as	  he	  faced	  his	  due	  punishment,	  literally	  sinking	  into	  despair,	  drowning	  with	  regret	  and	  sadness,	  realizing	  the	  loss	  that	  he	  had	  brought	  on	  himself.	  	  He	  experiences	  a	  change,	  one	  provoked	  by	   the	   experience	   of	   mercy	   in	   the	   face	   of	   judgment.	   	   In	   their	   actions,	   the	  Ninevites	   manifested	   an	   experience	   of	   justice	   as	   containing	   within	   it	   the	  possibility	   for	  mercy.	   	   One	   can	   imagine	   Jonah,	   sitting	   on	   the	   earth	   outside	  Nineveh,	   recalling	   his	   own	   reformation	   in	   reaction	   to	   this	   experience	   of	  justice	  as	  generated	   from	  the	  mixing	  of	  raw	   judgment	  and	  mercy.12	  	   In	   this,	  Jonah’s	  song	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  book	  offers	  a	  phenomenology	  of	  justice,	  one	  that	   God	   forces	   him	   to	   recall	   when	   he	   clings	   to	   the	   simple	   judgment,	   and	  hopes	  for	  the	  punishment,	  of	  Nineveh.	  And	  then	  there	  is	  that	  strange	  aphorism	  that	  appears	  suddenly	  at	  the	  climax	  of	  Jonah’s	  prayer	  from	  the	  belly	  of	  the	  fish:	  “They	  who	  cling	  to	  great	  vanity/folly	   (havlei-­‐sav)	   forsake	   their	   own	   mercy	   (ḥasdam).”	   This	   phrase,	  which	  sits	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  Book	  –	  the	  25th	  of	  48	  verses	  –	  has	  always	  troubled	   translators.	   	   The	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   key	   words,	   hevel	   and	   ḥesed,	   is	  challenging;	  so	  too	  is	  the	  third	  person	  personal	  participle	  that	  modifies	  ḥesed	  	  (surely	   those	   who	   hold	   to	   false	   vanities	   [illusions	   /	   empty	   appearances]	  forsake	  God’s	  compassion,	  not	  their	  own	  mercy?).	  	  Yet	  reading	  of	  the	  Book	  of	  Jonah	  given	  in	  this	  chapter,	  one	  in	  which	  the	  analogy	  between	  the	  judgment	  of	  Nineveh	  and	  the	  plant	  have	  poetic	  pride	  of	  place,	  offers	  an	  interpretation	  of	   this	   aphorism	   faithful	   to	   the	   central	   themes	   and	   preoccupations	   of	   the	  book:	  to	  commit	  to	  abstract	   judgment	  alone	  is	   folly;	  and	  doing	  so	  estranges	  one	  from	  the	  virtue	  of	  mercy,	  with	  its	  unsettling	  but	  vital	  demand	  to	  connect	  one’s	  sense	  of	  justice	  with	  the	  perplexities	  of	  lived	  experience.13	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   certain	   comfort	   to	   be	   found	   in	   judgment.	   	   It	   opens	   a	  reassuring	   moral	   chasm	   between	   the	   judge	   and	   the	   judged,	   sorting	   a	  confusing	  world	  neatly	   into	  right	  and	  wrong.	   	   In	  this	  way,	  clear	  and	  certain	  judgment	   makes	   the	   world	   more	   legible.	   	   This	   is	   its	   seductiveness,	   its	  considerable	  appeal;	  and	  this	  is	  the	  psychological	  sophistication	  of	  the	  Book	  of	   Jonah.	   	   A	  world	   in	  which	   judgments	   can	  be	   confidently	  made	   and	   relied	  upon	   seems	   sensible,	   orderly,	   and	   safely	   uncomplicated.	   	   It	   is	   a	   world	   in	  which	  action,	  desert,	  and	  consequence	  march	  in	  predictable	  sequence.	  	  That	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “This, and nothing else,” Scholem argues in his interpretation of the Book of Jonah, “is the 
meaning of justice in the deepest sense: that judgment is allowed, but the execution of it remains 
something entirely different" (ibid., 357, emphasis in original.) 
13 Nussbaum similarly views regard for complexity as at the heart of the exercise of mercy in 
judgment; whereas I look to biblical narrative and poetry in this chapter, Nussbaum, in her 
fascinating piece, offers the novel as a kind of literary paradigm for merciful engagement.  See 
Martha C. Nussbaum, "Equity and Mercy," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22.2 (1993): 83-125. 
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is	  the	  world	  in	  which	  Jonah	  wants	  to	  take	  refuge,	  just	  as	  he	  took	  refuge	  under	  the	  plant.	  	  It	  is	  the	  world	  that	  he	  seeks	  to	  preserve	  by	  fleeing,	  knowing	  that,	  once	  faced	  with	  the	  Ninevites’	  lived	  realities	  and	  capacity	  for	  change,	  mercy	  might	   complicate	  matters.	   	   Yet,	   however	   comforting,	   this	  world	   of	   abstract	  judgment	  is	  no	  more	  committed	  to	  the	  real	  than	  the	  evanescent	  plant.	  	  Justice	  for	   Nineveh	   comes	   when	   God	   takes	   account	   not	   only	   of	   the	   Ninevites’	  wickedness,	  but	  of	  the	  moral	  complexity	  of	  their	  situation	  and	  their	  capacity	  for	   insight	   and	   change.	   	   On	   this	   reading,	   the	   parable	   of	   the	   Book	   of	   Jonah	  teaches	  what	  Jonah	  learned	  in	  the	  belly	  of	  the	  fish:	  that,	  phenomenologically,	  justice	   is	   not	   found	   in	   condemnation	   and	   punishment	   alone,	   but	   in	   the	  confluence	  of	  judgment	  and	  mercy.	  	  
The	  Uncanniness	  of	  Mercy	  in	  Contemporary	  Political	  Justice	  
	  	   A	   central	   ambition	   of	   the	   modern	   liberal	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   to	   subject	  matters	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  claims	  and	  demands	  of	  reason.	  	  Beating	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   the	   contemporary	   commitment	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   it	  reflects	   “the	   internalization	   of	   reason	   itself	   as	   a	   regulative	   ideal	  within	   the	  political	  order.”14	  	  This	   ideal	  has	  yielded	  substantial	  goods,	  those	  associated	  with	   modern	   forms	   of	   governance	   and	   law.	   	   Predictability,	   certainty,	   and	  transparency	  are	   all	   aspects	  of	   justice	   emphasized	  by	   this	   account,	   and	  are	  among	  the	  cardinal	  virtues	  of	  the	  modern	  constitutional	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  Within	  this	  contemporary	  culture	  of	  law’s	  rule,	  certain	  personal	  and	  political	  virtues	  are	   exalted	  as	   the	  building	  blocks	  of	   justice:	   reason,	   fairness,	   and	   truth	   are	  the	  constituent	  elements	  of	  just	  law	  and	  governance.	  	  And	  so,	  when	  one	  turns	  to	   the	   scholarship	   offering	   theoretical	   reflection	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   justice,	  there	  is	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  character	  and	  claims	  of	  legal	  reason	  and	  the	   demands	   of	   fairness	   (in	   the	   hands	   of	   some,	   justice	   is	   fairness)	   in	   a	  liberally	  defensible	  approach	   to	   justice.15	  	  Yet,	   in	   this	   literature,	  one	   is	  hard	  pressed	   to	   find	   substantial	   reflection	   on	   the	   role	   of	  mercy	   as	   a	   political	   or	  legal	   virtue.16	  	   Indeed,	   talk	   of	   mercy,	   with	   its	   affective	   and	   discretionary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Paul W. Kahn, "Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key," Michigan Law Review 
101(2003): 2677, 2698. 
15 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001). 
16 Notable exceptions include Nussbaum, "Equity and Mercy"; N. E. Simmonds, "Judgment and 
Mercy," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13.1 (1993): 52-68.  Other literature that takes up issues 
of mercy tends to focus more specifically on the U.S. death penalty and questions of clemency.  
See, e.g., P.E. Digeser, "Justice, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Forgetting: The Complex Meaning of 
Executive Pardoning," Capital University Law Review 31(2003): 161; Austin Sarat, Mercy on 
Trial: What it Means to Stop an Execution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Austin 
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connotations,	   seems	   positively	   out	   of	   place	   in	   liberal	   political	   and	   legal	  thought.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  sensibility	  that	  one	  finds	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  parable	  of	   Jonah	  –	   that	   judgment,	  mercy,	   and	   justice	   are	   locked	   in	   an	  essential	   and	  immutable	  conversation	  –	   is	   foreign	   to	   this	   realm	  of	  contemporary	   thought	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  justice.	  	  	   	  This	  absence	  is	  even	  more	  notable	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  law;	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  practical	  judgments	  about	  justice	  in	  concrete	  cases.	  	  The	  language	  of	  justice	  spoken	  in	  the	  courts	  –	  indeed,	  the	  essential	  grammar	  of	  constitutional	  and	  criminal	  justice	  –	  is	  dominated	  by	  “balancing”	  and	  “proportionality,”	  the	  doctrinal	   expressions	   of	   the	   ambition	   to	   have	   reason	   rule	   justice. 17	  	  Reliability	   and	   truth	   feature	   prominently;	   due	   process	   is	   a	   veritable	   fetish.	  	  And	  so	  when	  one	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  and	  the	  act	  of	   punishment,	   the	   most	   violent	   corner	   of	   law,	   one	   finds	   that	   concepts	   of	  proportionality,	  desert,	   and	  culpability	   reign	  as	   the	   constituent	  elements	  of	  justice.	  	  It	  would	  be	  surprising	  –	  the	  reflection	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  category	  error	  or	  role	  transgression	  –	  to	  hear	  a	  contemporary	  judge	  overtly	  reasoning	  with	  the	  concept	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  mercy.	  	  All	  of	  this	  is	  an	  artefact	  of	  the	  way	  that	  justice	  is	  imagined	  in	  the	  liberal	  rule	  of	  law,	  a	  world	  in	  which	  the	  domains	  of	  law	  and	  justice	  are	  coextensive.	  	   Yet	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  so.	  	  For	  a	  substantial	  period	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  history,	  the	  architecture	  of	   justice	  was	  differently	   imagined.	   	   In	  the	  16th	  and	  17th	  centuries,	  the	  institutions	  of	  law	  sat	  alongside,	  and	  in	  dialogue	  with,	   institutions	   of	   “equity.”	   	   When	   the	   formal	   reason	   of	   the	   legal	   rule	  proved	  unjust,	  one	  could	  literally	  cross	  Westminster	  Hall	  from	  the	  courts	  of	  common	   law	   to	   the	   Chancery,	   where,	   sitting	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   King,	   the	  Chancellor	  would	   dispense	   the	   higher	   justice	   of	   equity.	   	   In	   1616,	   sitting	   in	  Star	  Chamber,	  an	  equitable	  court	  with	   jurisdiction	  over	  crime,18	  King	   James	  expressed	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  time:	  “There	  is	  no	  Kingdome	  but	  hat	  a	  Court	  of	  Equitie.”19	  	   This	   was	   not	   an	   empirical	   claim,	   it	   was	   an	   expression	   of	   the	  prevailing	  political	   imaginary,	   one	   in	  which	   the	   central	   task	  of	   government	  was	  to	  dispense	  justice	  and	  law	  alone	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  that	  task.	  	  In	  fact,	  King	  James	  declared	  that	  Chancery	  “exceeds	  other	  Courts,	  mixing	  Mercy	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sarat and Nasser Hussain, eds, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007).  
17 As Kahn puts it, proportionality review “is nothing more than the contemporary expression of 
reasonableness.”  Kahn, "Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key," 2698. 
18 In modern memory, Star Chamber has become irredeemably associated with the later politically 
motivated abuses of its discretionary powers, particularly during the reign of Charles I, excesses 
that led to the abolition of Star Chamber in 1641.    
19 Johann P Sommerville, ed., King James VI and I: Political Writings (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 216. 
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Justice,	   where	   other	   Courts	   proceed	   only	   according	   to	   the	   strict	   rules	   of	  law.”20	  	  He	  explained,	  “where	  the	  rigour	  of	  the	  Law	  in	  many	  cases	  will	  undo	  a	  Subject,	  there	  the	  Chancery	  tempers	  the	  Law	  with	  equity.”21	  	  Equitable	  courts	  were	   the	   locus	   for	   the	   expression	   of	  mercy	   and	   conscience;	   they	  were	   the	  institutional	   expression	  of	   a	   common	  sense	   in	  which	   justice	  was	  generated	  out	   of	   the	   interaction	   of	   the	   judgement	   of	   law	   and	   the	   political	   virtue	   of	  mercy.	   	   Writing	   in	   his	   1528	   treatise,	   Doctor	   and	   Student,	   Christopher	   St	  German	  explained	  the	  need	  for	  equity	  thusly:	  	  	   sith	   the	   deeds	   and	   acts	   of	   men	   for	   which	   laws	   have	   been	  ordained	  happen	  in	  divers	  manners	  infinitely,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  make	  any	  general	  rule	  of	  the	  law	  but	  that	  it	  shall	  fail	  in	  some	  case.	  …	  And	   therefore	   to	   follow	   the	  words	  of	   the	   law	  were	   in	  some	   case	   both	   against	   justice	   &	   the	   commonwealth.	  	  Wherefore	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  is	  good	  and	  even	  necessary	  to	  leave	  the	   words	   of	   the	   law	   &	   to	   follow	   that	   reason	   and	   justice	  requireth,	  &	  to	  that	  intent	  equity	  is	  ordained;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  temper	  and	  mitigate	  the	  rigor	  of	  the	  law.22	  	  Equity	  –	  the	  institutional	  expression	  of	  mercy	  –	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  those	  responsible	   for	   political	   and	   legal	   justice	   join	   the	   abstract	   principle	   of	   the	  legal	   rule	   with	   the	   messy,	   unpredictable,	   and	   unruly	   realities	   of	   lived	  experience.	  	   This	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  justice	  was	  based	  in	  a	  political	  theology,	  one	  in	  which	  the	  justice	  that	  one	  would	  expect	  from	  God	  would	  be	  translated	  into	  the	   structures	   of	   state	   and	   kingship.	   	   In	   his	   speech	   in	   Star	   Chamber,	   King	  James	   expressed	   this	   link	  well	  when	  he	   explained	   that	   “Kings	   are	   properly	  Judges,	  and	  Judgment	  properly	  belongs	  to	  them	  from	  God:	  for	  Kings	  sit	  in	  the	  Throne	   of	   God,	   and	   thence	   all	   Judgment	   is	   derived.”23	  	   As	   the	   available	  theological	  resources	  of	  the	  time	  explained,	  mercy	  was	  a	  defining	  property	  of	  that	   divine	   justice.	   	   In	   his	   Summa	   Theologica,	   responding	   to	   an	   imagined	  interlocutor’s	  objection	  that	  “mercy	  is	  a	  relaxation	  of	  justice”24	  unbecoming	  a	  just	  God,	  Aquinas	  explains	  that	  mercy	  is	  not	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  departure	  from	   justice:	   “mercy	  does	  not	   destroy	   justice,	   but	   in	   a	   sense	   is	   the	   fullness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Sommerville, ed., King James VI and I, 214. 
21 Sommerville, ed., King James VI and I, 214. 
22 Christopher St. German, Doctor and Student (eds. Plucknett and Barton; London: Selden 
Society, 1974 [1528]), 97.  
23 Sommerville, ed., King James VI and I, 205. 
24 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (vol. 1; New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947), 119. 
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thereof.”25	  	   And	   so	   one	   finds	   that	   in	   the	   16th	   and	   17th	   centuries,	   the	   higher	  justice	   found	   in	   God’s	   mercy	   took	   institutional	   form	   in	   the	   equitable	  jurisdiction	   of	   the	   King.	   	   This	   is	   how	   mercy	   was	   sutured	   into	   the	   larger	  conception	  of	   justice	   in	   the	  history	  of	   the	  common	   law	  system.	   	  Equity	  was	  the	   means	   of	   ensuring	   “that	   the	   Gate	   of	   Mercie	   may	   bee	   opened	   in	   all	  Calamitie	  of	  Suit:	   to	   the	  end	  (where	  need	  shall	  bee)	   the	  Rigour	  of	  Law	  may	  bee	   amended,	   and	   the	   short	   measure	   thereof	   extended	   by	   the	   true	  consideration	  of	  Iustice	  and	  Equitie.”26	  	   The	   Book	   of	   Jonah	   feels	   distant	   from	   this	   institutional	   and	   juridical	  history.	   	   On	   the	   interpretation	   offered	   in	   this	   piece,	   however,	   both	   are	  responding	   to	   something	   similar	   in	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   justice,	   namely,	  the	   salience	   of	  mercy	   in	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   justice.	   The	   success	   of	   the	  liberal	   rule	   of	   law	   has	   suppressed	   mercy	   in	   our	   political	   and	   legal	  vocabularies.	   	  And	  yet,	  though	  talk	  of	  mercy	  feels	  so	  foreign	  to	  the	  language	  in	  which	  we	  now	  formally	  discuss	  political	  and	  legal	  justice,	  the	  genealogical	  roots	  of	   the	  system	  and	   the	  mythical	   resources	   that	  have	  been	   the	   focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  still	  haunt	  our	  contemporary	  experience.	  	  Mercy	  appears	  not	  as	  wholly	  alien	  to	  us	  now	  but,	  rather,	  as	  uncanny.	  	  It	  is	  distant	  and	  yet	  somehow	  familiar.	  	  Freud	  described	  the	  uncanny	  as	  “in	  reality	  nothing	  new	  or	  alien,	  but	  something	  which	   is	   familiar	  and	  old-­‐established	   in	   the	  mind	  and	  which	  has	  become	   alienated	   from	   it	   only	   through	   the	   process	   of	   repression.”27	  	   The	  uncanny	   is	   the	   “secretly	   familiar.”28	  	   In	   our	   legal	   and	   political	   histories,	   as	  well	  as	  in	  our	  lived	  experience	  as	  reflected	  in	  our	  poetry,	  mercy	  is	  a	  secretly	  familiar	  dimension	  of	  justice.	   	  The	  uncanny	  conjures	  anxiety,	  wariness;	  it	   is,	  in	  some	  respects,	   frightening.	   	  For	  this	  reason,	   it	   is	  easier	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  uncanny	  with	  rejection	  rather	  than	  reckoning.	  	  And	  so	  it	  is	  with	  mercy	  in	  our	  modern	   conception	   of	   justice:	   it	   is	   unruly	   and	   ill	   fitted	   to	   a	   modern,	  secularized	   and	   rationalized	   legal	   and	   political	   culture	   and	   has	   therefore	  been	  exiled	  from	  –	  repressed	  in	  –	  authoritative	  discourse	  about	  the	  just.	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  justice	  –	  that	  to	  which	  the	   myth	   of	   Jonah	   and	   the	   life	   of	   equity	   differently	   attended	   –	   has	  fundamentally	  changed.	  	  The	  shrouded	  persistence	  of	  sites	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  discretion	   and	   conscience	   in	   our	   system	   of	   justice	   confirms	   what	   poetry	  suggests:	   that	   mercy	   is	   a	   real	   and	   essential	   part	   of	   the	   phenomenological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 119. 
26 William Lambarde, Archeion: Or, a Discourse upon the High Courts of Justice in England 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957 [1635]), 45.   
27 Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny'," in Art and Literature (ed. Dickson; vol. 14 of The Penguin 
Freud Library; London and New York: Penguin Books, 1985 (1919)) 339-76, 363-64. 
28 Freud, "The 'Uncanny,'" 368. 
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architecture	   of	   justice,	   one	   that	   drops	   out	   of	   sight	   in	   modern	   legal	   and	  political	  reflection	  on	  justice.29	  	   Such	   a	   misfit	   between	   modern	   modes	   of	   governance	   and	   what	   our	  history	  and	  cultural	  resources	  –	  our	  poetry	  and	  narratives	  –	  reflect	  about	  the	  lived	   challenges	   of	   doing	   justice	   should	   be	   of	   concern	   to	   legal	   and	  political	  theory.	   	  One	  might	  well	  ask	  what	  function	  this	  repression	  of	  mercy’s	  role	  in	  justice	  serves.	  	  The	  myth	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  chapter	  would	  suggest	  that,	  like	  Jonah,	   we	   find	   collective	   comfort	   in	   certainty	   and	   confidence	   in	   judgment	  untroubled	   by	   attention	   to	   the	   untidiness	   of	   everyday	   life.	   	   In	   matters	   of	  crime,	   fierceness	   in	   the	   movement	   from	   breach	   of	   a	   law	   to	   punishment	  enables	   swift	  passage	  past	   the	  knotted	   lines	  of	   responsibility	   for	   individual	  acts,	  past	  the	  moral	  complexity	  of	  both	  the	  criminal	  and	  the	  social	  world	   in	  which	  he	  acts,	  and	  past	  larger	  structures	  of	  injustice	  to	  which	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  respond.	   	  In	  a	  liberal	  legal	  culture	  shored	  up	  by	  the	  assumptions	  and	   efficiencies	   essential	   to	   our	   modern	   economic	   order,	   repression	   of	  mercy’s	   admonition	   to	   complicate	   is	   the	   easier	   path.	   	   A	   political	   or	   legal	  theorist	  might,	  then,	  wonder	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  this	  gap	  and	  the	  tendency	   to	  punitiveness	   and	  harshness,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   arid	   sense	  of	   social	  justice,	   so	   prevalent	   in	   contemporary	   politics	   and	   law.	   	   At	   minimum,	  refocusing	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   mercy	   and	   justice,	   as	   the	   Book	   of	  Jonah	   still	   invites	   us	   to	   do,	   suggests	   a	   political	   and	   legal	   scholarship	   that	  spends	   as	   much	   time	   reflecting	   on	   the	   sources	   and	   nature	   of	   mercy	   as	   a	  political	  virtue,	  as	   it	  does	  on	  the	  demands	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  dictates	  of	   law	  alone.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Benjamin L. Berger, "The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law 
and the Modern Constitutional Imagination," University of Toronto Law Journal 61(2011): 579.  
For a rare and superb example of this kind of reflection, see Nussbaum, "Equity and Mercy." 
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